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IRAQ, SANCTIONS AND SECURITY: A CRITIQUE
REEM BAHDI*
“Legal interpretation takes place in the field of pain and death.”1
Women’s pain and death blurs the distinction between war and peace.
Women are disproportionately starved, attacked physically, emotionally and
psychologically, and killed during both war and peace. This paper focuses on
the sanctions imposed against Iraq by the United Nations Security Council (“Se-
curity Council”) in response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990
and the on-going purported threat posed to international peace and security by
the Iraqi regime.2 Intended as a humane alternative to war, the sanctions have
nonetheless lead to such high levels of death and suffering, particularly among
women and children, that commentators have labeled them “genocide,”3 a “me-
dieval military siege,”4 and “a humanitarian disaster comparable to the worst
catastrophes of the past decades.”5 Not surprisingly, critics of the Security
Council have turned a plethora of human rights and humanitarian instruments
against the sanctions regime.
However, both the Security Council and its critics employ a fragmented
definition of “security” that focuses on political leaders and military choices and
assumes that security and human rights must be traded off against each other.
Consequently, neither side of the debate concerning the sanctions regime fully
explores whether “security” can be achieved through, as opposed to limited by,
an emphasis on human rights. This fragmented definition of security has pre-
vented the Security Council from duly regarding the human rights implications
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1. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
2. Sanctions were first imposed pursuant to Resolution 661 of August 6, 1990. See S.C. Res.
661, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2932nd mtg. ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990); see also S.C. Res. 687,
U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg. ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991), available at http://www1.
umn.edu/humanrts/peace/docs/scres687.html (last visited May 6, 2002).
3. Ramsay Clark, Fire and Ice, in CHALLENGE TO GENOCIDE: LET IRAQ LIVE 3, 26 (1998).
4. Hans Koechler, Ethical Aspects of Sanctions in International Law: The Practice of Sanctions Policy
and Human Rights, in DEMOCRACY AND THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW: PROPOSITIONS FOR AN
ALTERNATIVE WORLD ORDER 5 (1995), available at http://i-p-o.org/sanctp.htm (last visited May 5,
2002).
5. Marc Bossuyt, Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions and the Enjoyment of Human Rights,
U.N. Economic and Social Council, 52nd Sess., Agenda Item 12, ¶ 63, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/33 (2000), available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/
unreports/bossuyt.htm.
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of its policies, while also preventing the Security Council’s critics from properly
reconciling the quest for human rights with Iraq’s capacity to produce and de-
ploy weapons of mass destruction. In response, this paper suggests the need for
a more holistic understanding of “security” that includes respect for human
rights as both a component of and a means toward greater security, including
military security.
I. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: THE INVASION OF KUWAIT
AND THE SANCTIONS REGIME
The story of Iraq’s crime and punishment is well known in its broad out-
line. On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. That same day, the Security
Council passed Resolution 660, calling for Iraq’s immediate withdrawal from
Kuwait. On August 6, 1990, the Security Council passed Resolution 661, an or-
der for comprehensive trade, financial and military embargo of Iraq with the ex-
ception of certain limited humanitarian provisions. It also created the “661
Committee” or the “Sanctions Committee” to oversee the resolution.6 A coali-
tion of twenty-six countries under American command went to war against Iraq
in January 1991; this would prove to be the first of a series of military raids on
Iraqi soil. Throughout the fighting, tons of bombs, including a reported 315 tons
of depleted uranium,7 were dropped on Iraq; electrical stations and water purifi-
cation stations were bombed as military targets, and thousands of civilians were
killed.8 A United Nations investigation sent to Iraq shortly after the bombing
called the situation, “‘near apocalyptic’ and ‘concluded that life had been re-
duced to a ‘pre-industrial stage.’”9 According to some accounts, as many as
1,600 women and children died on February 13, 1991 alone when they were
burned alive during the bombing of the Amariyah Shelter.10
After six weeks of bombing, Iraq participated in a cease-fire agreement. Se-
curity Council Resolution 687 created the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM)
to oversee the destruction of Iraq’s biological and chemical weapons and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor Iraq’s nuclear capabil-
6. See United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme, Implementation of Oil-for-Food: A Chro-
nology, at http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/chron.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2002).
7. Doug Rokke, Depleted Uranium: Uses and Hazards 5, available at http://www.iacenter.org/
depleted/duupdate.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2002).
8. The exact number remains contested. Compare Louise Cainkar, Desert Sin, in BEYOND THE
STORM: A GULF CRISIS READER 338-45 (Phyllis Bennis & Michel Moushabec, eds., 1991) (putting the
number as high as 11,000 to 24,000 and pointing out the difficulties of arriving at exact figures), with
Human Rights Watch, Needless Deaths In The Gulf War: Civilian Casualties During the Air Cam-
paign and Violations of the Laws of War 13 (1991) (indicating that the organization can only give a
partial account of civilian casualties and therefore not providing a precise number but nonetheless is
creating an impression that casualties did not extend beyond a few thousand), at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/ 1991/gulfwar/ (last visited May 5, 2002).
9. John Quigley, The United Nations Security Council: Promethean Protector or Helpless Hostage?,
35 TEX. INT’L L.J. 129, 153 (2000) (quoting Excerpts from U.N. Report on Need for Humanitarian Assis-
tance in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1991, at A5); see also Paul Lewis, U.N. Survey Calls Iraq’s War Dam-
age Near-Apocalyptic, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1991, at A1.
10. Cainkar, supra note 8, at 342.
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ity.11 In 1995, Resolution 986 modified the embargo with the Oil-for-Food pro-
gram that permitted Iraq to sell a controlled quantity of oil so that proceeds
from sales could be used, in prescribed proportions, to fund the purchase of
humanitarian goods, pay the salaries of United Nations officials charged with
distributing humanitarian supplies or monitoring Iraq’s disarmament, and pay
reparations to Kuwait.12 The program was intended as a temporary measure but
has been extended to this day with various modifications. In its original form,
the program required that all contracts relating to goods entering Iraq be
screened by the Office of the Iraq Program in New York, which usually circu-
lated the request to the Security Council’s Sanctions Committee for considera-
tion. However, Security Council resolution 1409, adopted on May 14, 2002, in-
troduced the Goods Review List (GRL) and a new set of procedures for the
processing and approval of contracts for civilian supplies and equipment. Un-
der the new procedures only contracts that contain GRL items would be sent to
the 661 Committee for consideration.13 The Sanctions Committee is authorized
to veto any contracts related to items with potential military use or “dual use.”14
Where it questions an item’s potential or intended use, the Committee has the
authority to place the contract on hold pending further action or information.
Although the United Nations has not placed Iraq under total embargo, the sanc-
tions applied against that nation represent the most comprehensive and compli-
cated scheme ever imposed on a country by the United Nations.15
II. PUNISHMENT AS CRIME: WOMEN AND THE IMPACT OF SANCTIONS
Mohamed Ghani, the famous Iraqi sculptor, has described the devastating
and all pervasive nature of the sanctions regime in both words and art. Iraq,
Ghani observes,
[I]s being killed, far beyond food rationing; it is physical, mental, emotional and
intellectual. It is the very expression of nothingness; all these people die wait-
ing, for nothing. . .These families waiting, these women alone with their chil-
dren, their heads bowed. Passivity every day of the week. Reflection. Sadness.
Examine my sculptures representing people looking at an empty box: it is our-
11. UNSCOM was replaced by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission (UNMOVIC) in December 1999.
12. United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme, Oil-for-Food – The Basic Facts: 1996 to 2002, at
http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/basicfacts.html (last visited June 22, 2002).
13. Id.; see also S.C. Res. 1409, U.N. SCOR, 4531st mtg. ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1409 (2002), avail-
able at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2002/res1409e.pdf.
14. See United Nations Sanctions Secretariat, Department of Political Affairs, A Brief Overview of
Security Council Applied Sanctions 7 (November 1999), available at http://www.un.org/sc/
committees/sanctions/overview.pdf (last visited June 22, 2002) (surveying the resolutions related to
the sanctions against Iraq and observing that Resolution 687 “represents one of the most complex
and far-reaching set of decisions ever taken by the Council”).
15. Compare the sanctions imposed against Iraq with those imposed against Apartheid South
Africa in 1977 pursuant to Security Council Resolution 418 which prohibited the trade of arms and
military supplies to South Africa but never established a comprehensive sanctions regime. Sanctions
have also been imposed by the Security Council on several occasions including those brought
against Libya, Somalia, Angola, Rwanda, Liberia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, The Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and South Africa. See generally id. at 43.
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selves, the Iraqis, we are staring at life, this vacuum, this empty box, our life un-
der the embargo.16
There is no doubt that life under “the embargo” has visited destruction
upon the Iraqi people. To date the actual death toll remains contested.17 Yet, it
is clear that few have been spared the negative consequences of sanctions. At
least one commentator observed that “sanctions against Iraq have killed more
people than the two atomic bombs dropped on Japan.”18 In 1995, the United
Nations Secretary-General worried that “no more than 4% of the medicines
needed in Iraq were available during the past five months.”19 As late as Novem-
ber 2001, the Secretary-General warned that basic and higher education in Iraq
continue to be affected by severe shortages of teaching materials and other es-
sential resources.20
As is often the case, women pay a high price under the embargo in all as-
pects of their lives.21 In a few short pages one can only provide an impression of
the suffering endured by women. Clearly, women’s physical health has deterio-
rated. A recent survey of reproductive health states that,
Up to 95% of all pregnant women in Iraq suffer from anemia and thus will give
birth to weak, malnourished infants. Most of these infants will either die before
reaching the age of five due to lack of food and basic medicines or will be per-
manently scarred, either physically or mentally.22
Moreover, the maternal mortality rate per 100,000 live births has increased
from 160 to 294, making it the leading cause of death among Iraqi women of
child-bearing age.23 Rising maternal mortality rates reflect a more widespread
problem: people in Iraq are dying from diseases that were previously treatable
because the Iraqi health care system has collapsed in the shadow of the sanc-
tions. Accordingly, Iraqi women routinely watch their children die from causes
that, before 1991, were virtually unknown (such as cancers linked by some sci-
entists to depleted uranium exposure), or easily treatable (such as diarrhea).24
Sanctions have also placed a social toll on women. Not only are they facing
the physical, psychological, and emotional trauma that come with caring for
their sick and dying children, but they are also increasingly burdened with the
consequences of a debilitated economy and rising social conservatism. Early
16. Rachad Antonious & Raymond Legault, Iraq: Sanctions That Kill, available at http://www.
casi.org.uk/discuss/2000/msg00500.html (last visited May 5, 2002).
17. See Cainkar, supra note 8.
18. Roger Norman, A Human Rights Assessment of Sanctions: The Case of Iraq, 1990-1997, in
UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS: EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFECTS, ESPECIALLY IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, A MULTI-DISCIPLINARY APPROACH 33 (Willem J.M. van Genugten & Gerard A. de Groot eds.,
1999).
19. Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 11 of Resolution 986, U.N. SCOR, 52nd
sess. ¶ 49, U.N. Doc. S/1997/419 (1997).
20. Report of the United Nations Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Resolution 1360, U.N.
SCOR, 56th sess. ¶ 91, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1089 (2001).
21. Anne Orford, The Politics of Collective Security, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 373, 379-80 (1995-96).
22. Rania Masri, The Women and Children of Iraq Are Under Siege, THE PRISM (March 1997), at
http://www.ibiblio.org/prism/Mar97/iraq.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2002).
23. Antonius & Legault, supra note 16, at 24.
24. Id. at 26-29.
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marriage has resurfaced in rural parts of Iraq as teenage girls are married off to
reduce the number of mouths a family must feed.25 Moreover, young girls are
withdrawn from the education system—such as it is—because families prefer to
educate boys who have a better chance of securing future employment.26 Not
surprisingly, the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund,
UNICEF, reports that Iraqi female literacy rates have regressed over the last
decade.27 Finally, women have lost their jobs and abandoned their quests for
higher education in the face of their rising poverty.
Iraq’s relative prosperity prior to the imposition of the sanctions makes
their effect all that more tragic. Before 1990, The United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization, UNESCO, had honored Iraq for its active
promotion of education,28 and the World Health Organization reported that
Iraq’s “[h]ealth conditions were comparable to those of middle or high-middle
income countries.”29 Malnutrition was virtually unknown, access to healthcare,
education, drinking water and electricity was almost universal thanks to gov-
ernment infrastructure investments in the 1960’s and 1970’s.30 Sanctions, how-
ever, have helped turn back the hands of time.
III. AUTHORITY FOR THE SANCTIONS REGIME
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter grants the Security Council the
legal right to impose sanctions as a means of securing compliance from a nation
state.31 In particular, Article 41 recognizes that the Security Council can effect
the “complete or partial interruption of economic relations.” Moreover, Article
39 links sanctions to international peace and security. Article 39 provides that,
“[t]he Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or de-
cide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Article 41 and 42 to
maintain or restore international peace and security.”
Arguments advanced by proponents and critics of the sanctions line up
with different interpretations of the United Nations Charter and the powers it
grants to the Security Council under Chapter VII. Political realists insist that the
Security Council holds virtually unfettered discretion under Chapter VII.32 They
25. Id. at 31.
26. Id. at 31.
27. Id. at 21.
28. Ransi Masri, Situation Analysis of Children and Women in Iraq (Apr. 30, 1998), at http://www.
iacenter.org/unsit.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2002) (quoting and summarizing a UNICEF report by the
same name).
29. Dr. W. Kreisel, Health Situation in Iraq 2 (Feb. 26, 2001), available at http://www.embargos.
de/irak/sanctions/ep_hearing_who.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2002). This report was presented at the
Hearing “Iraq and the International Community” of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human
Rights, Common Security, and Defense Policy. Dr. Kreisel is the Executive Director of the World
Health Organization Office of the European Union.
30. Id.
31. U.N. CHARTER arts. 9-22.
32. See generally Martti Koskenniemi, The Police In the Temple: Order, Justice and the U.N. – A Dia-
lectical View, 6(3) E.J.I.L. 325, 327 (1995) (setting out the parameters of the interpretive debate be-
tween the realists and their opponents over the Security Council’s normative and institutional pow-
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rely on Article 24(2) of the Charter, which stipulates that the Security Council
“shall act in accordance with the Purpose and Principles of the United Nations.”
These are defined within Chapter I of the Charter itself. Those who adopt the
political realist position sometimes argue that the purposes and principles are
enumerated in order of importance.33 Therefore, the first principle, which refers
ers). Significantly, the various Security Council Resolutions in relation to Iraq do not point to human
rights or humanitarian norms that might limit the sanctions regime.
33. See Inger Osterdahl, THREAT TO THE PEACE: THE INTERPRETATION BY THE
SECURITY COUNCIL OF ARTICLE 39 OF THE UN CHARTER 83 (1999) (noting that the drafters of
the Charter clearly intended the goal of maintaining international peace and security to be superior
to the goal of encouraging respect for human rights but also arguing that the human rights may have
now attained a higher status); U.N. CHARTER arts. 1-2. The text of these articles is below:
Article 1
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means,
and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or set-
tlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to
strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic,
social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, lan-
guage, or religion; and
4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common
ends.
Article 2
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act
in accordance with the following Principles.
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from
membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance
with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a man-
ner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other man-
ner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in ac-
cordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state
against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations
act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to inter-
vene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall
require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but
this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter
VII.
Id.
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to the maintenance of international peace and security, constitutes the most im-
portant objective of the United Nations, and also the Security Council. In short,
the Charter dictates that order prevails over human rights. They also point out
that Article 103 of the Charter stipulates that the Charter shall take priority over
all other international instruments.34 The combined interpretive effect of these
provisions is that the Security Council need not be hindered by human rights
considerations in the pursuit of international peace and security.35
In contrast, some commentators insist that international human rights and
humanitarian law bind the Security Council. They argue that the United Na-
tions was created to promote respect for human rights and conclude that that
Article 1 of the Charter does not create a hierarchy among its enumerated pur-
poses and principles. Hence, the second purpose, “promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights” is equally as important as maintaining international
peace and security.36 Critics of the Security Council thus charge the Council
must be held accountable for the human rights and humanitarian suffering oc-
casioned by the sanctions imposed on Iraq, and, furthermore, that the Security
Council’s powers to act against Saddam Hussein are limited by these other hu-
man rights and humanitarian principles.37
IV. THE ZERO-SUM MODEL OF SECURITY
Despite their differences, the arguments advanced by opposing sides of the
sanctions against Iraq often share a problematique. They both adopt a particular
understanding of security that is ultimately statist in its orientation and focuses
attention on political leaders and military means. Proponents of the sanctions
conclude that the suffering occasioned by the sanctions represents an unfortu-
nate but necessary ingredient in the plan to contain Iraq’s capacity to produce
weapons of mass destruction. They point to Iraq’s continued obstruction of
UNSCOM inspections and monitoring activities, and information received from
Husayn Kamil Hasan al-Majid, Saddam’s son-in-law, as evidence of Saddam
Hussein’s willingness to deploy weapons of mass destruction.38 By contrast,
critics of the sanctions charge that the price for defeating Saddam Hussein and
containing Iraq’s capacity to produce weapons of mass destruction is too high.39
Yet, both sides of the debate implicitly accept that the term “security”
means freedom from foreign military-style attacks.40 That is, few question the
34. Paul Conlon, Lessons From Iraq: The Functions of the Iraq Sanctions Committee as a Source of
Sanctions Implementation Authority and Practice, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 633, 665 (1995). Conlon does not
necessarily take this position.
35. Koskenniemi, supra note 32 at 327.
36. Id.
37. Bossuyt, supra note 5, at ¶¶ 18-38.
38. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, IRAQ WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS 2 (1998), available at
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/iraq_white_paper.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2002).
39. See, e.g., IRAQ UNDER SIEGE: THE DEADLY IMPACT OF SANCTIONS AND WAR (Anthony Arnove
ed., 2000).
40. See, e.g., Erica Cosgrove, The Sanctions Dilemma and the Case of Iraq: Human Rights and Hu-
manitarian Challenges To The Use of Multilateral Economic Sanctions, 9 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC.
ISSUES 65 (1999), available at http://www.strakejesuit.org/fac/auzenne/sanctionslj2.htm (last visited
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premise that security and human rights must be traded off against each other;
they do not consider whether security can be achieved through, as opposed to
limited by, an emphasis on human rights. This zero-sum definition of security
has produced a lose-lose scenario. On one hand, the Security Council has not
fully recognized the human rights implications of its policies. On the other
hand, the Council’s human rights critics have not fully addressed the nature or
extent of the threat presented by Iraq to international peace and security. As a
result, the debate over policies options with respect to Iraq takes place on two
tracks that remain largely isolated from each other.41
V. THE FOCUS ON LEADERS
Theorists generally attribute the zero-sum understanding of security to
Thomas Hobbes’ social contract theory.42 Hobbes argued that free, rational indi-
viduals prefer order to chaos and will trade in their freedom as a means of over-
coming chaos and obtaining security. This quest for collective security neces-
sarily requires a compromise on individual rights. By implication, the greater
the security needs, the higher the trade off.43 This simple premise has had a pro-
found impact on security analysis. First, the Hobbesian premise that security
involves a trade-off between individual rights and collective security has re-
sulted in the confluence of individual security and state security.44 Conse-
Apr. 3, 2002). But see Orford, supra note 21 (challenging the statist approach to security, thus pre-
senting an exception to this usually two-sided debate).
41. See Richard Bilder & David Malone, Note, Iraq: No Easy Response to “The Greatest Threat,” 95
AM. J. INT’L. L. 235, 245 (2001) (reviewing RICHARD BUTLER, THE GREATEST THREAT: IRAQ, WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION, AND THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL SECURITY (2000) and pointing out that Richard
Butler, former head of UNSCOM, tends to denounce those who disagree with his approach as
pawns of Iraq).
42. Mariana Valverde, Governing Security, Governing Through Security, in THE SECURITY OF
FREEDOM 83 (Ronald J. Daniels et al. eds., 2001).
43. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Penguin Classics 1968) (1651). In particular, see Chapter XVII,
“Of The Causes, Generation, And Definition Of A Commonwealth,” where Hobbes describes the
Leviathan:
I authorise and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of
men, on this condition; that thou give up, thy right to him, and authorise all his actions in
like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a
COMMONWEALTH; in Latin, CIVITAS. This is the generation of that great
LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god to which we owe,
under the immortal God, our peace and defence. For by this authority, given him by every
particular man in the Commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power and strength
conferred on him that, by terror thereof, he is enabled to form the wills of them all, to
peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad. And in him consisteth the
essence of the Commonwealth; which, to define it, is: one person, of whose acts a great
multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the
author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all as he shall think expedi-
ent for their peace and common defence.
44. See Valverde, supra note 42, at 83-84 (discussing Hobbes); see also Orford, supra note 21, at
398 (also discussing Hobbes). See generally Juan. E. Mendez, Symposium on International Security:
Forward, Ethical and Humanitarian Concerns Add New Dimension To International Security In The Post-
Cold War World, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 383 (2001) (discussing the implications of
social contract theory on international relations and security).
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quently, security analysts direct attention largely towards the actions of state
representatives and political leaders.45
The sanctions against Iraq reveal the extent to which the Hobbesian in-
spired focus on states and their leaders pervades international actions. Propo-
nents of the Security Council’s actions against Iraq judge the utility of the sanc-
tions regime largely in terms of their ability to contain Saddam Hussein’s
capacity to produce weapons of mass destruction.46 Controlling Iraq’s leaders
remains the Security Council’s overriding priority, even in the face of compel-
ling humanitarian need. Hence, vital humanitarian goods, such as children’s
vaccines, have been placed on hold by the Sanctions Committee as possible dual
use items and therefore prohibited from entering the country even where their
use in the development of weapons of mass destruction is questionable and
their humanitarian value high.47
Second, Hobbesian approaches to security emphasize military style re-
sponses to threats because the military represents the traditional means em-
ployed by sovereigns to promote collective security.48 True to the Hobbesian
model, institutions set up to implement the sanctions regime in Iraq focus on the
military consequences of their decisions. There is little institutional space within
the Security Council for monitoring and addressing the human rights impact of
the sanctions.49
Significantly, a number of high-ranking and long-serving United Nations
officials charged with administering humanitarian programs in Iraq resigned
their offices because they felt morally obliged to condemn the sanctions regime
and its attendant humanitarian consequences but concluded that they could not
do so within the confines of the United Nations.50 While the Security Council
45. Valverde, supra note 42, at 90.
46. Perhaps this point is best illustrated by a comment made by then U.S. Secretary of State,
Madeline Albright, on 60 Minutes. When asked if the sanctions justified the death of half a million
Iraqi children, Albright responded, “[T]he price is worth it.” Andrew K. Fishman, Comment: Between
Iraq and a Hard Place: The Use of Economic Sanctions and Threats to International Peace and Security, 13
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 687, 687 (1999) (quoting interview); see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 38
(noting that “the United Nations established sanctions to prevent the purchase of equipment and
materials needed to reconstitute Baghdad’s WMD [Weapons of Mass Destruction] program”).
47. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WHO tried again to reduce holds, WHO-IRAQ
NEWSLETTER, Jan. 2001, at 2 (detailing the difficulties caused by the process provided under the
sanctions regime for obtaining approval of humanitarian goods), available at http://www.who.int/
disasters/repo/6645.doc (last visited May 5, 2002). Benon V. Sevan, Statement at the 221st meeting
of the U.N. Security Council Committee Established by Res. 661 (1999) (Jul. 12, 2001) (reviewing the
tortuous history of an urgent request for a blood gas analyzer), available at http://www.un.org/
Depts/oip/background/latest/bvs010712.html (last visited May 29, 2001).
48. See Valverde, supra note 42, at 84-86; see also Orford, supra note 21, at 381(commenting on the
focus on leaders and the military: “[t]o treat the decision to impose sanctions as a decision involving
only the U.N. and recalcitrant governments ignores the role all civilians, and particularly women,
are forced to play in order to survive these decisions”).
49. At least some have become uncomfortable with this reality. United Nation’s Security Coun-
cil Working Group on Sanctions, Draft Report 2 (Feb. 14, 2001), available at http://www.cam.ac.uk/
societies/casi/info/scwgs140201.html (last visited on Dec. 5, 2001).
50. Press Release, United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator For Iraq 3 (Mar. 1, 1999), at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/irq3-1.htm (last visited May 5, 2002). Hans Van
Sponeck, the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq who issued this press briefing, re-
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does receive reports from other United Nations institutions regarding the hu-
man rights situation in Iraq, it is clear that these reports have a relatively minor
impact on the processes and institutional priorities of the Security Council. For
example, the United Nations Secretary General’s various reports to the Security
Council spanning several years read like a hauntingly familiar script: the same
problems resurface year after year.51
Even the Oil-for-Food program does not alter the conclusion that the Secu-
rity Council focuses largely on the military objective of limiting Iraq’s capacity
to produce weapons of mass destruction without adequately considering the
human rights implications of its decisions for Iraqi civilians. First, the Oil-for-
Food program is wracked with problems and is not fully delivering on its
promise to mitigate the impact of the sanctions.52 The massive bureaucracy es-
tablished to administer the sanctions regime represents a poor replacement for a
functioning economy. Goods under the program are slow to arrive in Iraqi
markets in part because the programme requires that all foodstuffs be subject to
a series of inefficient and cumbersome inspection measures before it can be dis-
tributed.53 Moreover, on occasion suppliers ship defective, expired or spoiled
goods to Iraq, but Iraqi officials have no recourse under the Oil-For-Food pro-
gramme and cannot return such merchandise.54 At other times, essential items
received under the programme are not distributed, often because Iraq lacks the
means to deliver them.55 To further exacerbate the bureaucratic inefficiencies,
Iraq has not always been able to fulfill its quota of oil under the Oil-for-Food
program because its refinery infrastructure has been crippled by war and sanc-
tions.56
signed from his post in protest of the humanitarian impact of the sanctions. Van Sponeck resigned
on March 31, 1999. His predecessor, Dennis Halliday, resigned in protest in 1998.
51. Ongoing difficulties include the complexities of the paperwork required, serious and diffi-
cult delays in getting urgent items off the 661 Committee’s hold list, problems in distributing hu-
manitarian goods due to lack of infrastructure, inadequate medical supplies, and unavailability of
parts to revitalize water purification and electrical generation plants. See, e.g., Report of the Secretary
General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Resolution 1360, supra note 20, ¶ 3; see generally Report of the Secretary
General Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of Resolution 1143, U.N. Doc. S/1998/99 (1997); Report of the Secretary-
General Pursuant to Paragraph 11 of Resolution 986, U.N. Doc. S/1997/419 (1996).
52. Sevan, supra note 47.
53. Antonius & Legault, supra note 16, at 39. (Antonius and Legault rely on an interview with
George Somerwill, the information officer with the United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Co-
ordinator for Iraq, who was interviewed during a fact finding mission conducted between January
4–15, 2000). Sevan, supra note 47 (confirming the difficulties in administering the program and
pointing out that changes have been implemented while also rejecting Iraqi charges that the pro-
gram’s administrators are to blame and indicating that new procedures are being explored).
54. Antonius & Legault, supra note 16, at 40 (noting that it would appear that the same four or
five Western and Arab countries take advantage of this situation to unload spoiled goods on Iraq);
see also Sevan, supra note 47 (confirming that contractors do not always deliver goods as expected but
rejecting the suggestion that the program’s administrators are to blame).
55. Antonius & Legault, supra note 16, at 40.
56. Id. at 39. Antonius & Legault point out that Iraq was not able to produce its full quota of oil
between February 1998 and August 1999 because of the poor state of its oil industry infrastructure.
See also United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme, Weekly Update (8-14 June 2002), at http://
www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/latest/wu020618.html (last visit June 22, 2002). The update
reports that the volume of oil exports for the week of June 8 – 14, 2002,”remains sluggish.” As a re-
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Furthermore, even if the Oil-for-Food program functioned as intended, it
would not constitute an effective response to the suffering resulting from the
sanctions. The suffering in Iraq is not simply the result of a shortage of food but
also of the lack of clean water and the destruction of the education and health
systems.57 However, the Security Council has not fully turned its mind to un-
derstand how to deal effectively with these issues because it values defeating
Saddam Hussein over protecting the Iraqi people.58
The third consequence of the Hobbesian trade off between human rights
and security is that security analysis remains closeted and specialized.59 Human
rights are removed from the security equation. Security becomes the exclusive
domain of the military and intelligence services; individuals working outside
these institutions are perceived as unqualified or incapable of discussing secu-
rity.60 Human rights advocates appear to have internalized this notion. Conse-
quently, when human rights advocates criticize the sanctions imposed against
Iraq, they often remain silent about the military objectives that underlie the
sanctions regime; they too often fail to analyze in any detail whether Iraq has the
capacity to produce weapons of mass destruction, and do not fully discuss
whether sanctions ultimately deter military aggression.61 This silence is unfor-
tunate because it leaves the critics open to the charge that their arguments prove
naive and uninformed.
Further, the silence is problematic because it amounts to a concession that
security properly belongs to military and intelligence specialists. While the
military and intelligence services are honestly concerned with security, they also
have a professional bias in favor of military-style and intelligence-type solu-
tions.62 Evidence suggests, however, that such solutions may aggravate security
sult, $2.24 billion in approved humanitarian contracts cannot be processed because of a funding
shortfall. Id.
57. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, THE HUMAN RIGHTS IMPACT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON IRAQ 6, ¶ 12
(Sept. 5, 2000), available at http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/info/undocs/sanct31.pdf (last
visited Feb. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Human Rights Impact of Economic Sanctions in Iraq].
58. Although items needed for the revitalization of Iraq’s infrastructure have been placed on the
“fast track” approval list of the 661 Committee, this process is proving inefficient and ineffective.
Report of the United Nations Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Resolution 1360, ¶ 65, U.N.
Doc. S/2001/1089 (2001). Also, the Secretary-General had pointed to the need to address the water
and electrical stations in Iraq and highlighted the “extreme gravity of the situation and its acceler-
ated decline with potentially disastrous consequences” in a number of previous reports to the Secu-
rity Council. See, e.g., Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of Resolution 1143, ¶ 61,
U.N. Doc. S/1998/90 (1997). The impact of the revised procedure adopted in May 2002 pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1409 is yet to be determined. Whatever its benefits, the new procedure
cannot substitute for a functioning economy. See supra note 13.
59. Valverde, supra note 42, at 87.
60. Id at 86.
61. See, e.g., supra note 39. While this collection offers an excellent analysis of foreign policy and
reviews the effects of the sanctions in good detail, it does not address whether the Iraqi government
represents a real threat to the United States. By contrast, some military experts, including Scott
Ritter, a former UNSCOM inspector, challenge the claim that Iraq represents a significant military
threat to the United States. See, e.g., Jeffrey Donovan, Iraq: Experts Weapons of Mass Destruction
Potential, in RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY (Nov. 29, 2001) available at http://www.rferl.org
/nca/ features/2001/11/29112001091513.asp (last visited May 5, 2002).
62. Valverde, supra, note 42 ,at 87; Bilder & Malone, supra note 41, at 243-45.
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threats rather than ameliorate them.63 At the very least, the focus on military
style solutions limits our capacity to consider creative responses to the Iraqi cri-
sis based on alternative approaches to security that have proved effective else-
where.64
VI. CALLS FOR REFORM: THE IRRATIONAL COMES TO LIGHT
Given the limited meaning of security that guides its relations with Iraq,
the Security Council has been driven to irrational results and irrational behavior.
First, though Article 41 of the United Nations Charter contemplates sanctions as
a humane alternative to military action, the sanctions against Iraq have pro-
duced untold suffering and death. Thus, ironically, the people of Iraq have less
explicit protection under international law when the Security Council acts in the
name of “international peace and security” than when Saddam Hussein engages
in war against an enemy. Second, the actions against Iraq are irrational in light
of Saddam Hussein’s demonstrated willingness to endure the suffering of his
people rather than accept political or military defeat.65 Third, sanctions are in-
tended to enhance international peace and security, however, they have engen-
dered greater resentment towards the West, particularly the United States, and
have heightened Saddam Hussein’s popularity in the Middle East. One must
question whether these results undermine rather than enhance international
peace and security.66
Irrationality also pervades the legal debate over the sanctions. Supporters
of the sanctions contend that the Security Council is free to act unrestrained un-
der Chapter VII because it is not restrained anywhere else, while critics argue
that it is restrained outside of Chapter VII hence it must be restrained within it.67
Both sides, thus, are guilty of circular reasoning, and neither side grounded in a
definitive article of the Charter.68 Finally, irrationality is evident when the Secu-
rity Council and its member states blame Iraqi leaders exclusively for the suf-
fering of the Iraqi people,69 despite evidence indicating blameworthiness of other
parties.70
63. Id. at 238; see also Quigley, supra note 9, at 140-43.
64. See, e.g., MIKE BROGDEN & CLIFFORD SHEARING, POLICING FOR A NEW SOUTH AFRICA (1993).
65. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ (1999), at http://
www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar99/mde14.htm (last visited May 6, 2002) (detailing human
rights abuses by the Iraqi government against residents of Iraq including political executions, expul-
sion of populations and torture).
66. Bilder & Malone, supra note 41, at 241.
67. See Cosgrove, supra note 40, at 69-79.
68. Koskenniemi, supra note 32 at 327 (noting that recourse to the text of the Charter cannot re-
solve the debate between the “realists” who argue that the Security Council is fettered only by what
is politically possible and those who seek out normative limits on the Council’s authority. “The
purposes and principles are not less determinate than the concept of a threat to peace. Textual con-
straint is practically non-existent.”)
69. See, e.g., United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme, Oil-for-Food Background Informa-
tion, at http://www.un.org.Depts/oip/backgroundindex.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2001). The web
site of the United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme blames Saddam Hussein for the suffering
occasioned prior to the introduction of the Oil-for-Food programme because he allegedly initially
refused an offer by the Security Council to sell oil in return for humanitarian aid. There is no indi-
cation of the substance nor of the offer or the context in which it was made. Id.; see also, Interview by
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In the end, the sanctions imposed against Iraq may have changed the Secu-
rity Council more than they have changed the Iraqi leadership. The united front
of Security Council members has started to crack as member states like Russia
and France and broader United Nations institutions have called for a review of
the sanctions against Iraq.71 Some have even called into question the efficacy of
sanctions in general. Analysis of this type is undoubtedly needed as the Secu-
rity Council increasingly invokes sanctions as the weapon of choice in the post-
Cold War era.72
Yet, there is also a need to delve deeper and challenge the very meaning of
security at the international level. Such a fundamental examination remains
largely absent from international legal commentaries concerning the sanctions
against Iraq. The sanctions imposed against Iraq by the United Nations Security
Council illuminate the statist elements that dominate international understand-
ing of security. The sanctions also reinforce that international lawyers must un-
pack and closely examine international law’s conception of security in order to
better understand the past, evaluate the present, and imagine the future.
Feminists and thinkers across disciplines have challenged the traditional
Hobbesian approach to security. Their scholarship has much to offer the debate
over the Security Council’s sanctions on Iraq. For example, feminists point out
that the prevailing definition of security represents another instance of the pri-
vate-public split in international law that generally concerns itself with actions
of leaders over those of non-state actors.73 Thus, for example, international hu-
man rights treaties denounce forms of violence such as torture committed by
state actors in the so called “public” realm but do not explicitly address the vio-
lence visited upon women in their homes at the hands of their husbands and
partners.74 Criminologists have demonstrated that security and human rights
need not stand in opposition, and that the term “security” conceals a diverse ar-
ray of social and cultural values along with a range of governing, budgetary,
political and legal practices.75 Peace studies scholars also question who benefits
and loses from state-centered models of security.76 Human rights lawyers and
Amy Goodman with President Bill Clinton (Nov. 8, 2000) (regarding member states comments on
Iraqi leaders), available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/indexone.html.
70. The Secretary-General has repeatedly called on both sides to refrain from politicizing the
sanctions programme. See Report Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Resolution 1360, ¶ 127, U.N. Doc.
S/2001/1089 (2001). This report also confirms that the Iraqi government is not responsible for many
of the problems associated with the sanctions regime.
71. Human Rights Impact of Economic Sanctions on Iraq, supra note 57, ¶¶ 2, 5.
72. Exactly twelve of the fourteen sanctions imposed pursuant to Chapter VII of the United
Nations were introduced during or after 1990. U.N. Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-
General, The Use of Sanctions Under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, at http://www.un.org/News/
ossg/sanction.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2001).
73. Orford, supra note 21, at 384; Bernedette Muthien, Women’s Security Is Human Security:
Southern Dimension 4, available at http://www.copri.dk/copri/ipra/Conf-papers/muthien-
genderedsecurity.doc (last visited May 5, 2002).
74. See, e.g., Joan Fitzpatrick, The Use of International Human Rights Norms To Combat Violence
Against Women, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 532
(Rebecca J. Cook, ed., 1994).
75. Valverde, supra note 42, at 90.
76. See, e.g., JOHAN GALTUNG, PEACE BY PEACEFUL MEANS (1996).
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advocates have pointed out that peace and security differ because the absence of
conflict can sublimate an absence of justice that breeds more deadly conflicts in
the future.77 Sociologists and political scientists point out that national security
and international security are inseparable because poverty, human rights viola-
tions and environmental degradation give rise to instability and feed interna-
tional insecurity.78
Such approaches are feminist in their orientation because they highlight the
consequences of security policy for marginalized groups through a reading of
the silences. These approaches are also feminist because they insist upon a fun-
damental examination of narratives and power structures that sustain the status
quo.79 In the end, these approaches cast doubt on the claim that human rights
and security need necessarily be traded off against each other. Across the board,
feminist scholarship points to the need to move beyond military and statist ap-
proaches to security towards what can be called “relational security,” or the rec-
ognition that security may be cultivated through the promotion of human rights
and dignity.
Feminist scholarship proves particularly significant for the Security Council
and Chapter VII. The Security Council has begun to operate with an expanded
definition of security. For example, it includes human rights violations as a jus-
tification for humanitarian interventions under Chapter VII of the United Na-
tions Charter.80 The Security Council, however, has not adequately realized the
role that human rights play in fashioning solutions in response to Chapter VII
threats, just as its critics have not fully come to grips with Saddam Hussein’s
willingness to employ weapons of mass destruction.81
An enhanced understanding of how security can be evaluated and
achieved holds institutional, philosophical and doctrinal implications for the Se-
curity Council and its critics. If “security” itself consists of an explicit human
rights dimension, then one need not engage in the difficult exercise of importing
human rights considerations from other parts of the Charter into Chapter VII.
Rather, one can see that human rights considerations properly reside in Chapter
VII from the start. The duty to “maintain and restore international peace and
77. Juan E. Mendez, Symposium on Int’l Security: Forward Ethical and Humanitarian Concerns Add
New Dimension to Int’l Security in the Post-Cold War World, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y
383, 383 (2001).
78. See, e.g., BERTRAND BADIE & MARIE-CLAUDE SMOUTS, THE WORLD TURNS: SOCIOLOGY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL SCENE (3d ed., 1999).
79. See generally Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods In International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L.
379 (1999) for a discussion of these feminist techniques.
80. Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The United Nations at Fifty: The Security Council’s First Fifty Years, 89
AM. J. INT’L L. 506, 516-17 (1995). In practice, however, its humanitarian interventions have proven
inadequate and selective, thereby reinforcing that the Council’s commitment to “human security”
remains tentative. The difference between humanitarian intervention and an expanded under-
standing of security is that humanitarian intervention recognizes gross violations of human rights as
a trigger for military intervention. An expanded definition of security goes further and recognizes
human rights as a means towards peaceful co-existence, including but not limited to military secu-
rity.
81. Although controversial, The Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia
may be exceptions because they recognize the need to promote the rule of law as determinants of
long-term peace and security.
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security” under article 39 and elsewhere in the Charter necessarily requires an
examination of how human rights can serve as a means towards greater secu-
rity, including the security of women and girls.82 The task in each case will be in
determining how individual rights and military security can best complement
each other, and, conversely, how they are in conflict. Of course, this will not
prove a simple undertaking in the case of Iraq where massive suffering and
weapons of mass destruction co-exist. Part of the challenge lies in creating a
common security language that acknowledges the wisdom of both human rights
experts and military specialists, and that permits them to speak to each other
across their differences within and beyond the United Nations.83
Another part of the challenge lies in bringing more voices to bear on the Se-
curity Council’s decision-making,84 including the voices of security specialists
who understand the efficacy of responses based on horizontal social bonds
rather than vertical state powers, and who recognize that security is not a pur-
chasable commodity but a relationship that must be cultivated.85 While there is
little doubt that those concerned with the traditional statist aspects of security
must play a role with respect to Iraq, they should not be the prevailing source of
institutional wisdom about how to generate more security in an increasingly
interdependent yet divided world.86 History demonstrates that the most dra-
matic threats to security do not come exclusively from states. It is time to look
beyond the state and focus directly on individuals in defining both the meaning
and the means of security.87 Recasting “security” in both statist and human
rights terms may be one way towards these goals.
82. I recognize that expanding the definition of security within Chapter VII brings to higher re-
lief the question of whether the Security Council should be subject to review by other international
bodies, including the International Court of Justice. See generally Koskenniemi, supra note 32 at 327.
83. The Security Council Working Group is part of this project. See Bossuyt, supra note 5, ¶¶
101-09 (making recommendations for ways to improve dialogue amongst international actors in-
volved with the sanctions issue from various perspectives).
84. The Security Council has given more space to women. Secretary General Calls for Council Ac-
tion to Ensure Women are Involved in Peace and Security Decisions, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/7598 (2000). See
Hilary Charlesworth & Mary Wood, “Mainstreaming Gender” in International Peace and Security: The
Case of East Timor, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 313 (2001), for a critique; see also S.C. Res. 1325, U.N. S.C.O.R.,
4213th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1325 (2000). This Resolution calls on member states to increase the
participation of women at the level of peace building and post conflict restructuring. It also re-
quested the Secretary General of the United Nations to expand the role of women in all relevant
United Nations field activities including, but not limited to, human rights monitoring and military
observer missions. Finally, it urged greater attention to the impact of war on women. This resolu-
tion is highly valuable but its ultimate impact on the Security Council remains questionable. One
must also remember that the Security Council is dominated by Western men. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, while the Security Council appears, through this resolution, open to increasing the participa-
tion of women, it does not appear prepared to subject the notion of “security” to analysis. The
dominant conception of security as military security continues to prevail. Id.
85. Valverde, supra note 42, at 84, 87.
86. Id. at 87.
87. Some human rights advocates argue that the state represents the primary barrier to the full
realization of human rights. Hence, they regard human rights and state sovereignty as antithetical. I
am not necessarily advocating this approach. On the contrary, I suggest caution in this regard. Re-
orienting security analysis along a human rights axis in the name of women’s rights does not require
a wholesale rejection of states and state sovereignty. Women have always had an ambiguous rela-
tionship to sovereignty and states. On the one hand, the sovereign state and international human
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VII. CONCLUSION
Feminist legal scholarship as well as scholarship from criminology, political
science, sociology, peace studies and other disciplines help reveal that the defi-
nition of security that informs the Security Council and Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter makes certain policy options in relation to Iraq appear
natural and necessary, while rendering others more obscure. A redefinition of
“security” under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter is needed. Femi-
nists have already spearheaded a redefinition of seemingly unassailable and
steadfast legal terms such as “genocide”88 and “torture”89 so that they better re-
flect the experiences generated by the interactions of race, gender and other con-
stituents of identity with international law. The term “security” must be un-
packed and redefined in the same way. This re-interpretive task remains a
crucial but unfinished part of thinking about women’s relationship to war.
rights law’s emphasis on state responsibility has prevented the realization of women’s rights, as sov-
ereignty has proven a treasured shield in the hands of ruthless leaders resistant to international
scrutiny. On the other hand, women turn to the state to help secure or protect certain rights, par-
ticularly of the social and economic kind, and most recently in the face of rising economic globaliza-
tion. For some third world women, statehood also represented protection from colonialism, while it
remains an elusive but still sought after ideal for others. Hence, it is important not to fall into the
trap of equating the demise of state sovereignty with the advance of women’s rights and security.
88. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4, ¶ 10 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Sept. 2, 1998),
available at http://www.un.org/ictr/english/judgements/akayesu.html (last visited May 5, 2002).
89. Id. ¶ 596, 687.
